A bicooperative game is defined by a worth function on the set of ordered pairs of disjoint coalitions of players. The aim of this paper is to analyze the selectope for bicooperative games. This solution concept was introduced by Hammer et al. (1977) [20] and studied by Derks et al. (2000) [10] for cooperative games. We show the relations between the selectope, the core and the Weber set and obtain a characterization of almost positive bicooperative games as bicooperative games such that the core, the Weber set and the selectope coincide. Moreover, an axiomatic characterization of the elements of the selectope is obtained.
Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility is given by a finite set of players and a real-valued worth function defined on the set of all the subsets, or coalitions, of players such that the worth of the empty set is zero. For each coalition, the worth can be interpreted as the maximal gain or minimal cost that the players in this coalition can achieve by themselves against the best offensive threat by the complementary coalition. Classical market games for economies with private goods are examples of cooperative games. Here, we say that such a game has orthogonal coalitions (see Myerson [25, Chapter 9] ).
Games with non-orthogonal coalitions are games in which the worth of a coalition depends on the actions of its complementary coalition. Clearly, social situations involving externalities and public goods are such cases. For instance, the joint owners of a building are considering hiring a gardener to work in the common areas of their residence. The garden is a public good. Each owner can decide to support the proposal or to veto it. However, some of them may decide not to take part in the decision making and would thus not necessarily be defenders or detractors of the project. This is the case with multicriteria decision making when underlying scales are bipolar, i.e. a central value exists on each scale and it is considered a neutral value.
Situations of this kind may be modeled in the following manner. We consider ordered pairs of disjoint coalitions of players. Each such pair yields a partition of the set of all players in three groups. Players in the first coalition are in favor of the proposal, and players in the second coalition object to it. The remaining players are not convinced of its benefits, but they have no intention of objecting to it. This leads us in a natural way into the concept of bicooperative game introduced by Bilbao [1] . Bicooperative games generalize classical cooperative games in the sense that a player is allowed to play in favor or against some aim, besides non participation.
An application provided by one of the referees is the following example of a Chinese postman problem [7] . Each player is associated to one and only one edge of an undirected graph. In addition, each edge has a cost. A particular node, denoted by v 0 , represents the post office.
Then a S-tour associated with coalition S is defined by a closed walk starting at v 0 , visiting all players in S and coming back to v 0 . In the usual definition of a Chinese postman problem, a S-tour can also use edges associated to players outside S. Each player first pays the cost of his edge and a worth for coalition S is then measured by the minimal total cost of edges. However, it can happen that a subset T # N n S of the players outside S is not in favor of the S-tour. Then, one can imagine an alternative definition of a S-tour in which the closed walk can also use edges associated to the neutral players in N n ðS [ TÞ but not edges associated to players in T, i.e. the roads owned by the coalition of detractors T are not open for the S-tour. Bicooperative games incorporate this type of extra feature.
A central question in game theory is to define a solution concept for a game, or a class of games. A solution concept for a class of games is a function which assigns to every game a set of real-valued vectors, each one of them represents a payoff distribution among the players. The core [19] is one of the most studied solution concepts and it consists of all payoff vectors which distribute the worth of the grand coalition under the condition that the players in each coalition receive at least the amount that they can obtain by cooperating. However, if a game is not convex [28] , then the core can be empty. This leads us to considering other solution concepts. In 1978, Weber [30] proposed a set that is always nonempty. It is now called the Weber set. Weber showed that the core of any cooperative game is a subset of the Weber set, and Ichiishi [23] proved that if the Weber set is a subset of the core of a game, then the game is convex. Another solution concept, the selectope, was introduced by Hammer et al. [20] and independently by Vasil'ev [29] and investigated by Derks et al. [10] for cooperative games. This concept is the main objective of our paper. Briefly, the selectope contains all ways of distributing the so-called dividends of the coalitions between their members and it is also called Harsanyi set in [12] . The objective of this paper have been to generalize the concepts and prove the results in [10] for bicooperative games.
Let us briefly outline the contents of our work. We begin by introducing bicooperative games and, in this context, different solution concepts are considered: imputations, core and Weber set. In [2] , some relations between them are established. In the second part of this paper, we introduce the selectope for bicooperative game and we prove that the core and the Weber set are always contained in the selectope. Moreover, we give some conditions for which these solution concepts coincide. Finally, the elements of the selectope are considered from a value-theoretic point of view and we include a section of concluding remarks. Throughout this paper, for S # N, we use S n i instead of S n fig, the number of elements in S is jSj and uðSÞ ¼ P i2S u i for u 2 R n , with uð;Þ ¼ 0.
Bicooperative games
Let N ¼ f1; . . . ; ng be a finite set and 3 N ¼ fðA; BÞ : A; B # N; A \ B ¼ ;g. Grabisch and Labreuche [17] proposed the partial order in 3 N given by ðA; BÞ v ðC; DÞ () A # C; B D:
We denote by @ the relation defined by means of the weak strict inclusion, that is, ðA; BÞ@ðC; DÞ if and only if ðA & C; B DÞ or ðA # C; B ' DÞ.
The set ð3 N ; vÞ is a partially ordered set (poset) with the following properties: We model above mentioned class of non-orthogonal situations by mean of the set of all ordered pairs of disjoint coalitions, that is, the set 3 N and a worth function b : 3 N ! R. For each ðS; TÞ 2 3 N , the number bðS; TÞ can be interpreted as the gain (whenever bðS; TÞ > 0Þ or loss (whenever bðS; TÞ < 0) that S can achieve when T is the opposer coalition and N n ðS [ TÞ is the neutral coalition. The pair ð;; NÞ represents the situation if all the players object to the change and ðN; ;Þ represents the situation where all the players wish the change. À1 if i 2 T; 0 otherwise:
More generally, one may imagine that each player can choose one alternative and hence bicooperative games can be seen as a particular case of games with n players and r alternatives (for r ¼ 3), introduced by Bolger in [5, 6] . However, the r possible input alternatives analyzed by Bolger are not ordered and hence the lattice structures of the domains of bicooperative games and games with n players and three alternatives are different. For instance, the element ð;; ;Þ is central in our structure ð3 N ; vÞ and (0, 0, 0) is the least element in ð3 N ; "Þ, where " is the coordinatewise order. Note that in a bicooperative game, the value 0 is central, and À1, 1 are symmetric extremes. This suggests that bicooperative games are a symmetrization of classical cooperative games and this is the main reason to choose bð;; ;Þ ¼ 0. Also should be noted that bicooperative games with ordered finite output are a particular class of the (3, k) hypergraphs introduced by Freixas and Zwicker in [16] . In voting games, each voter has three choices: voting for a proposal, voting against it, and abstaining. Thus, only knowing who is in favor of the proposal is not enough to describe the situation. These games have been studied by Felsenthal and Machover [13] under the name of ternary voting games. They generalize the standard voting games by recognizing abstention as an option alongside yes and no votes. An special case of simple games are the weighted voting games. In the context of cooperative games, the power of a player to block a decision is the same as the player has in order to approve it. However, let us consider the quota q to take decisions and another quota p to block decisions. These situations can be represented by a simple bicooperative game b : 3 N ! fÀ1; 0; 1g, defined by bðS; TÞ ¼ 1 if wðSÞ P q and pðTÞ < p; À1 if wðSÞ < q and pðTÞ P p; 0 otherwise;
where each player i 2 N has a number of votes w i > 0 in order to approve a decision and a number of votes p i > 0 in order to block it. That is, a weighted voting bicooperative game is represented by the voting scheme b ¼ ½½q; w 1 ; . . . ; w n ; ½p; p 1 ; . . . ; p n . Another model suppose that each player can ''participate" at different levels, ranging from no participation to full participation. If there is a finite number of such participation levels, we have a multi-choice game (see Hsiao and Raghavan [22] , Nouweland et al. [27] ). In a multichoice game, each player has at his/her disposal a linear ordered set of levels of participation labelled 0; 1; . . . ; m where 0 indicates no participation, and m full participation. A multi-choice game is a function v : f0; 1; . . . ; mg N ! R such that vð0; . . . ; 0Þ ¼ 0: The number vðxÞ is the amount for profile of participation x 2 f0; 1; . . . ; mg N . Since f0; 1; 2g N is isomorphic to the set 3 N , the domains of bicooperative games and multi-choice games with m ¼ 2 coincide. But the lattice structures of these sets are different. In a 2-choice game, the levels of participation are 0 (non participation), 1 (mild participation), and 2 (full participation). However, in a bicooperative game, the value 0 is central, and À1, 1 are extreme values. We denote by BG N the set of all bicooperative games on N, that is
With the addition and multiplication by real numbers, the set BG N is a vector space. There are some special collections of games in BG The relevance of these collections of games is made clear in the following result (see [3, 4] ).
Proposition 1. The two collections f u ðS;TÞ : ðS; TÞ 2 3 N ; ðS; TÞ-ð;; ;Þg and fu ðS;TÞ : ðS; TÞ 2 3 N ; ðS; TÞ -ð;; ;Þg are bases of BG N and the dimension of BG N is 3 n À 1.
Solution concepts for bicooperative games
Since in a bicooperative game, bð;; NÞ is the cost (or expense) incurred when all the players object to a proposal and bðN; ;Þ is the gain obtained when all players are in its favor, then the net profit is given by bðN; ;Þ À bð;; NÞ. A solution concept for bicooperative games is a function that assigns to every bicooperative game a set of payoff vectors that distribute the net profit among the players. In [2] , we introduce two solution concepts for bicooperative games: the core and the Weber set.
A vector x 2 R n which satisfies P i2N x i ¼ bðN; ;Þ À bð;; NÞ is an efficient vector and the set of all efficient vectors, denoted by I Ã ðN; bÞ, is the preimputation set. The imputations for a bicooperative game b are the preimputations that satisfy the individual rationality principle for all players, that is, each player gets at least the difference between the amount that he can attain by himself against the rest of the players and the worth of the pair ð;; NÞ. Thus, the imputation set is IðN; bÞ ¼ fx 2 I Ã ðN; bÞ : x i P bði; N n iÞ À bð;; NÞ for all i 2 Ng:
Another distribution criterion is the following: every pair ðS; TÞ 2 3 N receives at least the amount it contributes to the pair ð;; NÞ, the difference bðS; TÞ À bð;; NÞ. Now, two different sets of players contribute to the formation of each ðS; TÞ 2 3 N . On the one hand, the players who are in N n T do not act against the players of S and so, they must receive a payoff (represented by a vector z 2 R n ). On the other hand, those players in N n T who also are in S must get an additional payoff (represented by a vector y 2 R n ). This leads us to the following definition of the core of a bicooperative game b which is an extension of the classical core of cooperative games (see [2] ), CðN; bÞ ¼ x 2 I Ã ðN; bÞ : there exist y; z 2 R n such that x ¼ y þ z; and yðSÞ þ zðN n TÞ P bðS; TÞ À bð;; NÞ; for all ðS; TÞ 2 3
In order to extend the Weber set to a bicooperative game ðN; bÞ, it is assumed that ðN; ;Þ is formed by a sequential process where at each step a player joins the defender coalition or a player leaves the detractor coalition. These sequential processes are obtained for each chain from ð;; NÞ to ðN; ;Þ. For each chain, a player can evaluate his contribution when he joins the defenders or when he leaves the detractors. with an ordering h ¼ ði 1 ; . . . ; i 2n Þ on N in such a way that KðS j ; T j Þ ¼ hði j Þ for all j ¼ 1; . . . ; 2n, where hði j Þ ¼ fi 1 ; . . . ; i j g is the set of predecessors of i j in the order h and its elements are written following the order of incorporation in the defender coalitions or desertion from the detractor coalitions. That is, if i j > 0; i j is the last player who joins S j ði j 2 S j and i j R S jÀ1 Þ and, if i j < 0; Ài j is the last player who leaves T jÀ1 ðÀi j R T j and À i j 2 T jÀ1 Þ. These vectors are extensions of the marginal worth vectors in the cooperative case. Its definition and properties have allowed to prove that the core of a bicooperative game is always included in its Weber set (see [2] ). It is easy to see that the vectors a h ðbÞ satisfy efficiency, that is P j2N a h j ðbÞ ¼ bðN; ;Þ À bð;; NÞ. These vectors are extensions of the marginal worth vectors in the cooperative case. Its definition and properties have allowed to prove that the core of a bicooperative game is always included in its Weber set (see [2] ). 
The selectope for bicooperative games
The above solution concepts are subsets of the imputation set and hence they are defined for games with nonempty imputation sets. We now introduce a new solution concept, the selectope, for which IðN; bÞ could be empty. This solution concept was introduced by Hammer et al. [20] and investigated by Derks et al. [10] in the case of cooperative games. Now, we extend this concept for games b 2 BG N . The definition of the selectope is based in the dividends of Harsanyi [21] . We define the dividend of ðS; where u ðA;BÞ 2 BG N is the superior unanimity game for ðA; BÞ -ð;; ;Þ. Applying the Möbius function to formula (1) (see [17] ), these coefficients satisfy Proof. First of all, we prove that the selector a is well-defined. Indeed, for every ðS; TÞ 2 3 N n fð;; NÞg one and only one of the following cases hold:
Case 1: There exists a unique i 2 S such that ðS; TÞ v K À1 ½hðiÞ, where i is the last player in N n T who joins S in the maximal chain h 2 Hð3 N Þ.
Note that i 2 N n T satisfies K À1 ½hðkÞ v K À1 ½hðiÞ for all k 2 S.
Case 2: There exists a unique j 2 N n ðS [ TÞ such that ðS; TÞ v K À1 ½hðÀjÞ where j 2 N n T is the last player who leaves T in the maximal chain h 2 Hð3 N Þ. This player j 2 N n T is such that K À1 ½hðÀkÞ v K À1 ½hðÀjÞ for all k 2 N n ðS [ TÞ.
Therefore, a is well-defined and it is the selector that associates, to every ðS; TÞ 2 3 N n fð;; NÞg, the last player who joins the defender coalition or leaves the detractor coalition. Now, for every i 2 N and b 2 BG N ; we get 
Since the proof of this result is rather long and it is very close to that of cooperative game in [10] , this proof is included in the Appendix A. This result permit us to affirm that there is a one-to-one correspondence between permutations and consistent selectors, and between marginal values and selector values corresponding to consistent selectors.
The relation between the core and the selectope for bicooperative games, is obtained as a direct consequence of Theorems 1 and 2, because of CðN; bÞ # WðN; bÞ # SelðN; bÞ. This result can also be proved with an alternative proof which is closely related to the proof of the inclusion of the core in the Weber set for cooperative games given by Derks [9] and it is similar to the proof of the analogous result in [4] .
We now prove that the equality SelðN; bÞ ¼ CðN; bÞ characterizes a class of games called almost positive. for all ðA; BÞ 2 3 N , where the inequality follows because of the dividends of game b are nonnegative for all ðS; TÞ 2 3 N such that jTj < n À 1.
Since CðN; bÞ is convex, we have SelðN; bÞ # CðN; bÞ and this implies (a). h
As a consequence of this result, we deduce that every almost positive bicooperative game has nonempty core. Recall that every game b 2 BG N can be written as a linear combination of superior unanimity games, where the coefficients are the dividends of the pairs in 3 N .
Then we define the games We have showed that the almost positive bicooperative games are the unique games for which SelðN; bÞ ¼ CðN; bÞ and in [2] is proved that the core of a bicooperative game is equal to the Weber set if and only if the bicooperative game b 2 BG N is bisupermodular, that is
for all ðS 1 ; T 1 Þ; ðS 2 ; T 2 Þ 2 3 N . Thus, as always WðN; bÞ # SelðN; bÞ, it is obvious that for the almost positive games, the Weber set is a subset of the core and so, these games are bisupermodular. Therefore, we can establish the following characterization. In Crama et al. [8] , a characterization of the class of almost positive cooperative games in terms of inequalities on the coalitional worths is given. A similar characterization can be obtained in the context of bicooperative games. For this purpose, we introduce the following concept. 
for all ðS 1 ; T 1 Þ; . . . ; ðS m ; T m Þ 2 3 N . Note that the bisupermodularity of order m implies bisupermodularity of order p whenever 2 6 p < m. (3) is zero, so we may assume p P 1. In this case (3) reduces to 1 P X p l¼1 ðÀ1Þ lþ1 p l ; which holds with equality because it is the expansion of ð1 À 1Þ p .
Next, consider AE u ð;;NnkÞ with k 2 N and assume that k 2 N n T i holds true for exactly p of the indices i 2 f1; . . . ; mg. If p ¼ 0 then all terms in (3) are zero, while for p P 1 the above counting argument still works (a minus sign is no obstacle, since the inequality holds with equality). Finally, for AE u ð;;NÞ the same argument with p ¼ m works.
ðbÞ ) ðaÞ Let ðS; TÞ 2 3 N with jTj < n À 1. Then jN n Tj P 2 and b bisupermodular of order m for all integers m P 2 implies that b is bisupermodular of order jN n Tj. Using this fact for the collection fðS i ; T i Þg i2NnT with
for all i 2 N n T; and taking into account formula (2) we obtain d b ðS; TÞ P 0. h
An axiomatization of the values of the selectope
In this section the selectope will be considered from a value-theoretic point of view. A sharing system is a collection (1) and (2) the summation is taken only over consistent selectors, then the corresponding sharing value is the compatible-order value [4] . These values fill up the Weber set.
Sharing values can be characterized by a set of axioms. Let us consider a value w : BG N ! R N . The axioms under consideration are the following. Proof. It is easy to check that a sharing value satisfies the desired axioms. Attention will now be restricted to the opposite direction of the characterization. For every ðS; TÞ 2 3 N n fð;; NÞgand i 2 N n T define q to that of cooperative case [10] , changing the unanimity cooperative game u S by the superior unanimity bicooperative game u ðS;TÞ : h
Concluding remarks
The elements of the Weber set of a bicooperative game are characterized in [4] as the values satisfying Linearity, Dummy, Monotonicity and Efficiency axioms. Furthermore, the Shapley value is the only one that satisfies Linearity, Dummy, Anonymity, Efficiency and Structural axioms (see [3] ). It is possible to obtain a characterization of these values by using Additivity instead of Linearity and Null-Player instead of Dummy-Player. In relation with the characterization of the elements of the Weber set, Derks introduces in [11] [11, 12] can also be extended to the bicooperative case by using similar arguments as in our paper.
On the other hand, in the cooperative case the sharing values corresponding to consistent sharing systems are weighted Shapley values (see [24, 26] ). In Ref. [26] it is shown that weighted Shapley values cover the core and in Ref. [10] is showed that these values are the only ones that satisfy Additivity, Null-Player, Efficiency, Positivity and Partnership axioms. For the bicooperative case, a consistent sharing system q can be defined as follows. The sharing system q is consistent if, for all coalitions ðA; BÞ; ðS; 
:
The solution concepts for bicooperative games given in Section 3 have a straightforward analogy with well-known concepts of cooperative games. Its advantages lies in the automatic fashion in which the properties of bicooperative games can be obtained from them. In other words, the results obtained in this paper and in Refs. [2] [3] [4] imply a narrow closeness between cooperative and bicooperative models with respect to the selectope, the core and the Weber set. For this reason, we state now, without further elaboration, that weighted Shapley values for a bicooperative game can be also characterized by a set of similar axioms to the cooperative case and that these values cover the core of a bicooperative game. for 1 6 k < 2n: We prove that the selector a coincides with b 2 Að3 N Þ defined in Proposition 2 for this chain, i.e. 
We distinguish two cases:
(1) If K À1 ½hðjÞ w K À1 ½hði 2n Þ n i 2n and K À1 ½hðjÞ n j6 wK À1 ½hði 2n Þ n i 2n , then K À1 ½hðjÞ is a pair ðA; BÞ such that jAj ¼ n; jBj ¼ 0 or jAj ¼ n À 1; jBj ¼ 0, but in every maximal chain there is only one coalition with jAj ¼ k 1 and jBj ¼ k 2 elements, for all 0 6 k 1 ; k 2 6 n, and the pair ðN; ;Þ is excluded. Therefore,
0 otherwise: By repeating this argument, the maximal chain h is obtained. h
